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Abstract
This paper provides updated empirical evidence about the real and nominal effects
of monetary policy in Italy, by using structural VAR analysis. We discuss different
empirical approaches that have been used in order to identify monetary policy ex-
ogenous shocks. We argue that the data support the view that the Bank of Italy, at
least in the recent past, has been targeting the rate on overnight interbank loans.
Therefore, we interpret shocks to the overnight rate as purely exogenous monetary
policy shocks and study how different macroeconomic variables react to such shocks.
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1 Introduction
Many studies have recently investigated how monetary policy affects the economy.1
However, there is probably only one empirical finding that is robust enough, both
over time and across countries, to be viewed as a monetary “fact”. This finding
is the existence of a close-to-one long run correlation between the rate of growth
of different monetary aggregates and the inflation rate.2 On one side, this can be
considered as an argument supporting the old quantity theory of money. On the
other side, it leaves ground for many important questions to be further investigated.
From an empirical point of view, less consensus seems to have been obtained with
respect to either the long run relationships between money growth (or inflation) and
output growth,3 or to the short run dynamics following monetary policy impulses.
In the latter case, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is clearly different
across countries, being affected mainly by the structure of the financial system and
the degree of openness of the economies. In turn, these factors might be depending
on other institutional considerations, such as the legal and tax systems in place or
the efficiency of court procedures.4
Most of the studies analyzing the short run response of the economy to monetary
policy have been conducted by using the methodology of Structural Vector Autore-
gression (SVAR).5 This approach has the advantage of imposing a minimal set of
theoretical restrictions on the model to be tested, thereby allowing for a close-to-
pure statistical investigation of the time series properties of the variables included
in the analysis. In this literature, a monetary policy shock is identified with the
residual of an equation regressing a monetary policy instrument on a set of variables
that are considered relevant for the decisions of the central bank. Hence, monetary
policy shocks are defined as statistical innovations and represent a purely exoge-
nous component of policy. Impulse responses of different macroeconomic variables
to these shocks are not subject to the rational-expectation critique6 and can then
be interpreted as the empirical dynamics beyond the comparative statics exercises
developed in standard equilibrium analysis. A drawback of this analysis is that the
impulse responses do not consider the “endogenous” component of monetary policy,
such as any feedback rule linking policy to the state of the economy. Indeed, this
endogenous component might well be even more important than the exogenous one.
But, since it is hard to identify and single out the original source of the many shocks
hitting the economy and to which policy responds, the consequences of these en-
dogenous changes in monetary policy are more difficult to interpret as they combine
the effect of the original shocks and that of the policy reaction.
1See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) and Clarida, Gal`i and Gertler (1999a) for recent
surveys. Other useful general references are Goodfriend and King (1997) and the recent textbooks
by Walsh (1998) and Blinder (1998).
2See Mc Candless and Weber (1995) and Lucas (1996).
3See Mc Candless and Weber (1995) and Barro (1995), for example.
4See Cecchetti (1999).
5See Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Sims (1992), Strongin
(1995), Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996), Clarida and Gertler (1996), Bernanke and Mihov (1997,1998)
and Bagliano and Favero (1998). Canova (1995) and Watson (1994) provide a general method-
ological discussion.
6See Keating (1990) for a discussion on SVAR and rational-expectations econometric models.
In this paper we present empirical evidence about how monetary policy shocks
can be identified and are transmitted to other variables in the Italian economy, by
applying VAR analysis.7
We believe that Italy provides an interesting case study for different reasons.
First, important institutional changes have affected, in the last decade, both
the degree of economic and political independence8 of the Bank of Italy, as well as
the environment in which monetary policy is decided and implemented. In terms
of central bank independence, between 1992 and 1994 a series of laws were passed
giving the central bank Governor the exclusive responsibility to set and change the
monetary policy instruments (the discount rate and the reserve coefficient, as well
as full control on the growth rate of the monetary base). In particular, any source
of direct and permanent financing of the Treasury deficit via high-power money was
prohibited.9 As regards the modus operandi of monetary policy, this had already
been substantially modified by the introduction, at the end of the 80s, of a series
of important institutional changes in the money market. A screen-based market
for Treasury Bills was opened in 1988, the one for interbank deposits in 1990. The
mandatory reserve regime was also gradually reformed (starting by 1990) so as to
allow banks to average provisions in the maintenance period. Other important
changes have been the abolition of the floor price on T-Bills auctions (1988) and a
new discipline in terms of fixed-term advances.10
Second, in the 90s, Italy achieved a stable reduction in the inflation rate. This
was accompanied by a lower-than-average rate of economic growth with respect to
previous decades. Economic growth was also considerably lower, in this period, than
in other European countries that were facing similar (although smaller in magni-
tude) problems in terms of fiscal adjustment required to meet the Maastricht budget
criteria. It is important to assess the role that monetary policy played in generating
these macroeconomic outcomes.
Third, Italy can be viewed as a good example of a “small” open economy. Most
of the studies on the US and Germany are conducted in a closed economy framework.
In the Italian case, we will be interested in evaluating the role of the exchange rate
under different perspectives: as a monetary policy intermediate target, as a trans-
mission channel of the monetary impulses and as an information variable monitored
by the central bank. The different roles performed by this variable might have
affected the operating procedures that the central bank used in order to conduct
monetary policy.
We start by presenting some general and preliminary descriptive evidence on
short run empirical relationships between money, interest rates and output in Italy.
7See Nicoletti Altimari et al. (1995) for a study conducted on the basis of the Bank of Italy
Quarterly Econometric Model. Previous applications of VAR analysis to Italy are Bagliano
and Favero (1995), Buttiglione and Ferri (1994), De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998, 1999), and
Gaiotti, Gavosto and Grande (1997).
8Political independence is defined as the ability of the central bank to establish its policy targets
without government interference. Economic independence is defined as the ability of the central
bank to autonomously maneuver its instruments in order to reach the monetary policy goals. See
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991).
9See Passacantando (1996). Price stability was explicitly stated as the primary target of mon-
etary policy only in 1998.
10See Gaiotti (1992) and Sarcinelli (1995).
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Although interesting, and maybe suggestive, this evidence deals with simple statis-
tical associations. It cannot be used to derive any conclusion in terms of causality
links among these variables. Hence, we move to what we consider a more sophis-
ticated form of dynamic correlation analysis, and estimate simple and atheoretical
VAR models that use monthly data on output, prices, a money aggregate and an
interest rate. Here, we show how it is possible to use different, although arbitrary,
identification mechanism in the attempt to isolate a measure of an exogenous mon-
etary policy shocks. Simulation analysis conducted through these models, however,
produces results which are quite at odd with the predictions of traditional as well
as new theoretical views of what the effects of monetary policy should be. Many
empirical “puzzles” seem to arise from this analysis.
Hence, we turn to give a structural content to the VAR methodology, by linking
econometric analysis with the institutional knowledge of how the market for banks
reserves (i.e., the market in which monetary policy is actually conducted) works,
following a research strategy introduced by Strongin (1995) and Bernanke and Mihov
(1998) and extended to Italy by De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998). We estimate a
larger dimension VAR model where identification hinges on a detailed description of
the operating procedures used by the Bank of Italy. The advantage of this procedure
is that it allows the researcher to directly test different model alternatives that
are nested in the same specification, without imposing a priori one identification
mechanism. The correct measure of a monetary policy shock is then selected by the
data itself.
Finally, we use our measure of monetary policy shocks to simulate the response
of a set of nominal and real macroeconomic variables to a monetary impulse. We
study how different interest rates, as well as variables in the banking sector, react
following a monetary contraction. But we do also study the dynamics of aggregate
demand components, employment and wages.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide some basic descrip-
tive evidence using dynamic correlations and graphs. VAR analysis is introduced
in section 3, where identification is achieved by imposing an arbitrary order of ex-
ogeneity to the variables included in the analysis. In section 4 we discuss how it
is possible to combine vector autoregression techniques with institutional analysis,
while in section 5 we present our model of the Italian economy. The transmission
of monetary policy shocks to other macreoconomic variables is studied in section 6,
and we briefly conclude in 7.
2 Descriptive Evidence
Short run empirical relationships between monetary and real variables are relevant
as they provide information about the way in which private agents react to changes
in the state of the economy (“shocks”) and about how monetary policy is managed
in order to respond to these shocks.
A first look at these relationships can be obtained by simply computing cross-
correlations and plotting graphs of the relevant time series. We restrict to the post
1982 period, as monetary policy in Italy could hardly be considered as indepen-
dently managed before the so called “divorce” from the Treasury (1981). In Figure
3
1, we plot the detrended log of real GDP with different monetary aggregates, each
in its detrended form.11 Over the time horizon considered, the statistical definition
of the monetary aggregates was modified to include new monetary instruments orig-
inated by financial innovation, or in response to a change in the economic function
performed by a single instrument. However, roughly speaking, M0 is the mone-
tary base, cash held by the private sector plus banking reserves; M1 is cash plus
checking deposits (and some minor items), while M2 includes M1 plus time and
savings deposits and CDs. We observe that Figure 1 provides no evidence of a pos-
itive correlation between detrended monetary aggregates and output. The finding
of such a correlation, plus the observation that periods of high monetary growth
were usually preceding output peaks in the US economy was the basic foundation
for Friedman and Schwartz (1963)’s conclusions that “money matters” and “money
leads output”. Although the same correlation is not any longer evident in post 1982
US data (see Walsh, 1998), Figure 1 seems to present a totally opposite picture. In
Italy, a negative statistical correlation can be observed between detrended money
and output.
This finding is confirmed by Figure 2, plotting the dynamic correlations of de-
trended monetary aggregates (MIt+j) with current detrended output (Yt), where
I = 0, 1, 2 and j = −8, · · · − 1, 0, 1 . . . 8. Periods of high output with respect to
trend are associated with previous periods of low levels of money (with respect to
trend). Moreover, with the exception of the monetary base, money measures are
negatively correlated with output up to 5 leads. If we restrict the analysis to the
90s, similar results are obtained.
Tobin (1970) and, more recently, King and Plosser (1984) have argued that evi-
dence of a positive correlation between money and output cannot be interpreted as
suggesting that high money levels induce or “cause” high levels of output. Analo-
gously, our finding does not lead to conclude either that monetary policy or that
money growth has a negative effect on output. The reason is that monetary aggre-
gates cannot be viewed as correct indicators of monetary policy, as they combine
elements of both money supply and money demand. If the reverse causation argu-
ment is accepted (King and Plosser, 1984), so that money “follows” output, then
a negative correlation might as well be explained by the following story. High lev-
els of output are often associated with rising prices. This can induce expectations
of higher inflation rates and increase the nominal interest rate, which in turn will
induce a portfolio reallocation away from money. Moreover, if monetary policy is
targeting the inflation rate it will respond to these movements by reducing the mon-
etary base and finally money supply. Of course, other stories are equally admissible.
One might also wonder if any sensible relationship can be detected from real money
balances and output. In Figure 3, we show the dynamic correlations of real balances
(in terms of M1 and M2) vis a vis output. Here, the pattern exhibited by the data
replicates the standard finding of the aggregate-demand/aggregate-supply textbook
model. Real money balances are positively correlated with output at lags; high
levels of output with respect to trend are preceeded by high levels of real money
balances (and followed by low levels, as at leads the correlation is negative). But
again the evidence is only suggestive. In any case a relevant endogeneity problem
11Data are quarterly observations. Trends are obtained by using a Hodrick-Prescott filter.
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is present when using monetary aggregates as a monetary policy indicator. This
problem might be particularly severe if the monetary authorities used a short term
interest rate as a monetary policy instrument. And indeed, many authors have
underlined that, in many countries, this is the case.12
Figure 4 (and 5) associate movements in short term interest rates with detrended
real GDP. We have used the 3-month Treasury bill rate and the overnight rate
(for the latter, the time series is reasonable only starting from 1988, due to the
characteristics and the peculiar functioning of the old “market” for interbank loans
in the country13).
These figures provide some support to the view that monetary policy might have
contributed to the Italian business cycle. For example, the two serious slowdowns
of the 90s have been preceeded by increased levels of the interest rates. However,
the endogeneity problem, in a way, is present also here, in particular regarding the
T-bill rate. As a matter of fact, the market rate is simultaneously determined by
supply and demand conditions. High interest rates might be induced by high market
demand for credit or low credit supply, as well as by restrictive monetary policy.
3 Preliminary VAR Analysis
Although monetary aggregates and the level of short term interest rates could be
regarded as useful indicators of the monetary conditions in a single country, the
discussion above made clear that changes in their time pattern cannot be unam-
biguously interpreted as monetary policy shocks. However, from an empirical point
of view it is essential to be able to isolate these shocks. Should we only focus on
monetary policy “actions”, which include feedback responses of policy to many other
possible shocks hitting the economy, we would never come up with a measure of the
macroeconomic effects originated by a purely exogenous change in monetary pol-
icy. We would only describe the mixed effects originated by different heterogeneous
shocks and by how policy makers react to these shocks. Even though this reaction
might in practice account for most of the ordinary monetary policy interventions,
from a scientific point of view we would still like to investigate the effects of a mon-
etary policy shock isolated both by other kinds of shocks in the economy and by the
endogenous changes that these other shocks might push. Moreover, as mentioned
above, the responses to unforecastable (and structural) innovations are less subject
to the Lucas’ critique.
Structural VARs have been useful in pursuing this strategy. In a structural
VAR, after the estimation of the unrestricted vector autoregression (i.e., with no
contemporaneous interactions among the variables), the econometric identification
of economically meaningful (i.e., structural) innovations occurs in a second stage
where reasonable constraints must be introduced.14 These constraints are typically
designed as restrictions on the contemporaneous influence among fundamental (i.e.,
12See Blinder (1998), Clarida, Gal`i and Gertler (1999a, 1998). A careful analysis of monetary
policy operating procedures in the major industrial countries was undertaken by Borio (1997).
13See Cotula (1989), Sarcinelli (1995) and Passacantando (1996).
14See Amisano and Giannini (1997, chap. 1). Technically, the estimation of a structural VAR
with Choleski decomposition can be developed equation by equation with ordinary least squares,
by using the properties of a Wold causal chain.
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non-structural) and structural innovations, where the latter are assumed to be mu-
tually and serially uncorrelated. Basically, the analyst has to make a number of
identifying assumptions in order to be able to estimate the reaction function of the
central bank, including assumptions on what variables are monitored and on what
kind of interaction the exogenous policy shock has with variables in the reaction
function of the monetary authority (the so called endogenous component of policy).
The main identifying assumption is that policy shocks have to be orthogonal to
variables in the reaction function of the central bank.15 Hence, within the system
of equations in the VAR, policy shocks can be estimated as the residuals in the
linear regression of the central bank instrument on the variables in the central bank
reaction function. According to this assumption, the monetary policy instrument
changes following a contemporaneous innovation to the variables in the informa-
tion set of the central bank; while these latter variables are constrained to have no
contemporaneous reaction to a change in the policy instrument. Obviously, this
assumption can be sensibly maintained when the observation period is one month.
It is less acceptable when the VAR deals with yearly or even quarterly data.16
We start by estimating two simple 3-variable monthly VARs including, in order,
consumer prices, an index of real activity (industrial production), and a monetary
policy instrument. The latter is a monetary aggregate (M2, which was actually used
as an intermediate target in the 80s and the early 90s) in the first VAR and a short
term interest rate (3-month T-bill rate) in the second. Identification is achieved
by imposing a triangular recursive structure among the variables, according to the
assumption that prices and output do not contemporaneously respond to a change in
the monetary instrument (and that prices do not even contemporaneously respond to
a change in output). The data set goes from January 1982 to May 1998; estimation is
performed by including twelve lags and uses the full information maximum likelihood
(FIML) method. The impulse response functions to a monetary policy shock are
plotted in Figure 6. The results are quite disappointing. In Panel (a) of Figure
6, for example, a positive innovation in money supply (because of our identifying
assumption) has a positive impact effect on prices and a negative impact effect on
output. After a few months, the response is never significantly different from zero
on both variables.17 In Panel (b) of Figure 6, a positive innovation in the short term
rate (contractionary monetary policy shock) induces an increase in consumer prices
which is significant for up to 2 years. Output declines one year after the shock with
a negative peak at about 2 years. However, the information set in these models may
be too limited. We then move to estimate a set of 4-variable VARs including both
a short-term interest rate and a monetary aggregate.
Within the same sample, we nest the previous two exercises and estimate a
VAR including consumer prices, output, M2 and the 3-month T-bill rate. The
impulse response functions (IRF) are plotted in Figure 7.18 In Panel (b) of Figure
15Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) call this the Recursiveness Assumption.
16An alternative identifying assumption is to exclude contemporaneous reaction of the policy
instrument to variables in the central bank information set while allowing the latter to contempo-
raneously respond to changes in the policy instrument. See Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996).
17In this paper “significant” is always referred to the 95% confidence interval. In all graphs
of the impulse response functions dashed-line bands refer to the 95% confidence interval and are
computed by the delta method (Hamilton, 1994, and Amisano and Giannini, 1997).
18We have also estimated the model with quarterly data and obtained similar results.
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7, by interpreting a positive innovation to the interest rate as a contractionary
monetary policy shock we see that money declines immediately and significantly
for almost two years and output is also negatively affected and exhibits a hump-
shaped response. The response of prices is instead puzzling, as they continue to
show a persistent increase after the shock. This “price puzzle” has been discovered
in other studies focusing both on Italy and other major industrial countries. The
rationale which appears to be more accepted is that it must be considered a signal
of mispecification of the model.19 In Panel (a) of Figure 7, we plot the responses to
a positive innovation in M2 in the same model. If the latter were to be interpreted
as a monetary policy shock, the response of the interest rate would be puzzling, as it
shows an impact positive reaction. This finding, labeled the “liquidity puzzle”, has
been at the centre of quite a lively debate in the US literature.20 In our model, and
given our identifying assumption, this response is not surprising if the innovation
to the money aggregate is interpreted as a money-demand shock (rather than as a
money-supply shock).
When replacing M2 with a narrower money aggregate (i.e. the monetary base or
total bank reserves), instead of solving the likely endogeneity problems linked to the
definition of M2, one obtains that the IRFs to a positive innovation in the short-term
interest rate show evidence of both a “price” and a “liquidity” puzzle. Consumer
prices and the monetary base (or bank reserves) increase after a contractionary
shock. These results might be induced by the fact that although the 3-month T-Bill
rate is a money market rate and closely follows monetary policy actions, it could
be hardly identified with a policy instrument and its innovations with a monetary
policy shock. Accordingly, we limit estimation to the subsample for the 90s and
substitute in the original VAR model the interest rate on overnight interbanking
loans to the 3-month T-Bill rate. Figure 8 reports the obtained IRFs. In Panel
(b) of Figure 8, after a monetary contraction, M2 slightly declines, and output
and prices fall, with the reduction in output stronger and statistically significant
at impact and after 10 months (and up to 22). We repeated the exercise with
the monetary base and total bank reserves in place of M2, obtaining qualitatively
similar results, although sometimes less statistically significant. Panel (a) of Figure
8 confirms that a structural innovation to M2 induces a positive impact increase in
the overnight rate. The effect on output and prices is instead considerably different
from the one obtained in Panel (a) of Figure 7. The price level is not affected, while
output increases (significantly) only after more than 2 years from the original shock.
Overall, the exercises performed in this section are based on simple statistical
models that have no theoretical foundations or institutional background. The “mea-
sure” of monetary policy shock is left to the arbitrariness of the researcher, that can
select it among different candidates, including a battery of monetary aggregates
and short-term rates. And a “measure” is preferred to another if the results that
19Sometimes, adding an index of commodity prices help to either reducing the entity or elimi-
nating the puzzle (See Sims, 1992). For the Italian economy, Gaiotti, Gavosto and Grande (1997)
show that the puzzle disappears if price expectations and import prices are included in the VAR.
We have estimated our simple VAR model with the IMF world index of export commodities (IFS
00176AXD) and found no evidence of success in eliminating the puzzle. However, the price puzzle
is practically eliminated by estimating a larger VAR including a set of variables from the market
of bank reserves, as we show in section 5 below.
20See Gordon and Leeper (1992) or the comment to Sims (1992) by Christiano (1992).
7
produces are more or less in accordance with previous believes about what the ef-
fects of monetary policy should be. Moreover, the impulse response functions are
also sensible to the ordering of the variables in the VAR. In the next two sections,
we will show how it is possible to overcome these limits by linking econometrics to
knowledge of the institutional aspects of how monetary policy is actually managed
and implemented in each single country, by describing the targets, instruments and
procedures that define a so called “monetary regime”. Within this framework it
will be possible to test for different specifications of the same analytical model, each
based on a different proposed “regime” and have the correct one singled out and sup-
ported by the data. This methodology has been developed by Strongin (1995) and
Bernanke and Mihov (1998). It has been extended to an open-economy framework
and applied to Italy by De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998). Although it is not
itself immune from criticism,21 we believe it is the best current framework to identify
monetary policy shocks and study the effects of such shocks on the economy.22
4 Econometrics meets Economics
In the preliminary analysis presented above, we have analyzed simple structural
VARs where one policy variable is listed last. This is similar to what has been done
for the US economy by Bernanke and Blinder (1992), who used the Fed Funds rate,
or by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), who selected the nonborrowed reserves
aggregate. The ordering structure is meant to reflect policy endogeneity; within
the time unit (e.g., one month) policy variables are not allowed to affect nonpolicy
variables (e.g., an index of the general price level, an index of output, etc.).
Bernanke and Mihov (1997, 1998) have recently generalized the approach of
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) by considering
a vector of policy variables, instead of just one policy variable. In the first stage,
the estimation of an unrestricted VAR generates two subvectors of innovations, one
related to nonpolicy variables (uy,t) and one to policy variables (up,t)
23
R(L)
[
yt
pt
]
=
[
uy,t
up,t
]
where R(L) is a matrix of polynomials in the lag operator L and R(0) = I; yt is
the vector of nonpolicy variables and pt is the vector of policy variables.
In the estimation of the orthogonalized, economically meaningful (structural)
innovations in the second stage, a recursive causal block-order is assumed from the
set of nonpolicy variables to the set of policy variables. Moreover, the recursive
causal order is also established for the nonpolicy variables in yt. In terms of the
relationship between the fundamental innovations, uy,t and up,t, and the structural
innovations, vy,t and vp,t, which are mutually and serially uncorrelated, this implies:
21See Rudebusch (1996) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998).
22Bagliano and Favero (1999) show that the main features of the monetary transmission mech-
anism in US and Germany are not relevantly affected by including in the VAR models exogenous
measures of monetary policy shocks derived from financial market information.
23Bold lower-case (capital) letters indicate vectors (matrices).
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[
A1,1 0
A2,1 A2,2
] [
uy,t
up,t
]
=
[
B1,1 0
0 B2,2
] [
vy,t
vp,t
]
where A1,1 is lower-triangular and B1,1 is diagonal so that there is a Wold recur-
sive (causal) ordering among the nonpolicy variables in yt. Moreover, A2,1 is a full
matrix so that there is a Wold block-recursive (causal) ordering between nonpolicy
and policy variables.
Building on previous work by Strongin (1995), the vector of policy variables
contains aggregates and interest rates characterizing the market for bank reserves.
As a matter of fact, monetary policy is effectively conducted through the market for
bank reserves. The idea is then that, in order to correctly identify a monetary policy
shock, it could be useful to model the different operating procedures of the central
bank according to appropriate constraints in the relationship between up,t and vp,t.
Hence, the core of the analysis focuses on the shape that the matrices A2,2 and B2,2
must take for the different operating procedures to work properly. This requires
linear and nonlinear constraints on the elements of those two matrices. A test for
overidentifying restrictions can finally be applied to check whether the constraints
implied by the different regimes are rejected by the data. Impulse response functions
of policy and nonpolicy variables to monetary shocks are used to further check
whether the identified monetary-policy innovations can be plausibly qualified so.24
5 A model of the Italian Economy
In this section we summarize and re-estimate in a larger sample the model in De
Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998). This model applies the empirical framework
described in section 4 to study recent Italian monetary policy.25 The focus of our
analysis will be on the market for bank reserves, where monetary policy is actually
implemented. We define different monetary regimes according to the necessary
constraints implied on the central bank operating procedures in this market.
24In this empirical approach to monetary policy, nonstationarity of the data is not generally
emphasized and cointegration analysis not undertaken. A first justification is that the data may
be quasi-nonstationary ; in fact, the presence of unit roots in the time series cannot be tested with
high power (see, for instance, Campbell and Perron, 1991). Moreover, even though unit roots
may characterize the data, Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) show that most traditional, standard
asymptotic tests are still valid if the VAR is estimated in levels.
The neglecting of cointegration constraints is motivated by the following considerations. First,
the analysis is generally focused on short-run constraints and the short-run dynamic response
of the system. When cointegration constraints are excluded, this only implies that the long-run
responses of some variables are not constrained and might follow a divergent path. However, the
short-run analysis is still valid. Second, Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) proved that standard
asymptotic inference is not affected even when the variables included in the VAR in levels are
cointegrated. Finally, although FIML estimates are no longer efficient if cointegration constraints
are not included, they still remain consistent. Hence, the lower efficiency in the estimates can
be justified by the objective difficulty in the economic interpretation of some of the cointegration
constraints showed by the data.
25See Bernanke and Mihov (1997) and Clarida and Gertler (1997) for similar studies on monetary
policy in Germany.
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We include in the VAR model two nonpolicy variables, consumer prices and an
index of industrial production. These variables affect the estimation as they enter
in the reaction function of the central bank. We also take into account the exchange
rate vis-a-vis Germany, explicitly modelling Italy as a small open-economy.
Following Kim and Roubini (1995) and Clarida and Gertler (1997), we chose
to consider the real rather than the nominal exchange rate. Indeed, according to
sticky-price models the two rates have an identical pattern in the short run, so that
the real exchange rate inherits the jumping (asset-price) nature of the nominal one.
However, the real exchange rate plays a more important role in the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy and, therefore, is more informative to study the
dynamics of the nonpolicy variables.
In the VAR model, the exchange rate is listed last, after the block of policy
variables. Indeed, although the exchange rate is clearly a nonpolicy variable, we
cannot exclude the contemporaneous reaction of the exchange rate to innovations
in the policy variables, in particular to innovations in the short-term rate.26
Hence, the relationship among fundamental and structural innovations can be
summarized as follows:
 A1,1 0 0A2,1 A2,2 0
a3,1 a3,2 1
 uy,tup,t
ur,t
 =
 B1,1 0 00 B2,2 b2,3
0 0 b3,3
 vy,tvp,t
νr,t

where ur,t and νr,t are respectively the fundamental and structural innovation related
to the real exchange rate; a3,1 and a3,2 are full (row) vectors and the (column) vector
b2,3 represents the possible correlations between the structural innovations in the
market for bank reserves (including a possible monetary policy-induced variable)
and the structural innovations in the exchange rate.
The kernel for our identification strategy is the lower-right corner of the system,
which models the market for bank reserves and explicitly considers the role of the
exchange rate:
1)
[
A2,2 0
a3,2 1
] [
up,t
ur,t
]
=
[
B2,2 b2,3
0 b3,3
] [
vp,t
νr,t
]
5.1 The Italian Market for Bank Reserves
A description of how the Italian market for bank reserves works and of the operating
procedures of the Bank of Italy is given in Buttiglione, Del Giovane and Gaiotti
(1997).27 Here we simply explain our model equations. In terms of innovations, we
specify the demand for total reserves as:28
26See Bagliano et al. (1999) for a complete discussion of the difficulties that emerge in correctly
identifying monetary policy shocks in a setting where the exchange rate is also present. These
difficulties are normally due to the simultaneous relation between interest and exchange rates
innovations, and can be responsible of new empirical puzzles, as the one of an impact depreciation
of the nominal exchange rate following a contractionary monetary policy shock in the domestic
country.
27See also De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998).
28We omit the time subscript t to ease notation.
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2) uTR = −αuOV + σdνd
where uTR is the innovation in total reserves, uOV is the innovation in the overnight
interest rate and νd is the unit-variance, orthogonal innovation in the demand for
total reserves (i.e., an indicator of the shifting in the demand for total reserves);
σd is a measure of the standard deviation of the structural shock assigned to this
equation. We use the rate on overnight loans since this has recently become the
most important interest rate in the market for bank reserves.
We then divide the total amount of bank reserves in the sum of two aggregates
that we define, in line with the US literature, as borrowed and nonborrowed reserves.
We define fixed-term advances as borrowed reserves.29 The nonborrowed reserves
aggregate thus includes the item Anticipazioni Ordinarie30 and all open-market op-
erations. Our sorting can be motivated by the fact that Anticipazioni Ordinarie: a)
were of limited amount, established by the central bank; b) should have rationally
been used first as the least-costly source of finance;31 and c) could in principle be
canceled by the Bank of Italy with short notice.32
In terms of innovations, the demand for fixed-term advances can be expressed
as a positive function of the spread between the overnight rate and the rate on
fixed-term advances:
3) uFTA = −β(uiFTA − uOV ) + σbνb
where uFTA is the innovation in the fixed-term advances and uiFTA is the innovation
in the interest rate on fixed-term advances; νb is a unit-variance, orthogonal shock
related to the borrowed-reserves component (i.e., a measure of the shift in the de-
mand for fixed-term advances) and σb is the standard deviation of the structural
shock related to this equation. Since the rate on fixed-term advances has always
been changed discretely and according to monetary-policy decisions during the pe-
riod under investigation, we set uiFTA = 0 and consider only innovations in the
overnight interest rate as a determinant of the demand for fixed-term advances.33
We then model the central-bank direct intervention in the market for bank re-
serves by specifying how it supplies nonborrowed reserves, namely:
4) uNBR = φ
dνd + φbνb + φrνr + σsνs
29Fixed-term advances (Anticipazioni a Scadenza Fissa) is an explicit standing facility that could
be automatically drawn by banks and on which a penalty rate is applied. This “ceiling” rate in
the money market was established by the central bank analogously to the discount rate. The two
official interest rates defined a corridor that normally contained the every-day fluctuations of all
other money-market rates.
30A credit line that banks could activate with the Bank of Italy, providing a limited amount of
low-cost finance. The discount rate (tasso ufficiale di sconto), usually a floor for money market
rates, was the cost paid by banks on the amount of credit effectively drawn from this line.
31In reality, though, this credit line is never completely used since many cash managers keep a
portion of the line as a buffer stock. However, the unused credit is quantitatively negligible.
32Similar choice was made in Bernanke and Mihov (1997b) for Germany.
33The same strategy, with respect to the discount rate, has been applied by Bernanke and Mihov
(1998) in their study of US monetary policy. Alternatively, Bernanke and Mihov (1997) considered
an additional equation for the rate on fixed-term advances when studying German monetary policy.
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where νr is the unit-variance, orthogonal innovation in the real exchange rate (to
be defined in the last equation), whereas νs is the own (unit-variance and orthog-
onal) innovation in monetary policy, a measure of the exogenous component of the
monetary policy stance; σs is the standard deviation of this measure.
The latter equation represents the operating reaction function of the monetary
authorities in the market for bank reserves. An innovation in the supply of nonbor-
rowed reserves is designed to offset structural innovations in the demand for total
reserves (νd), in the demand for borrowed reserves (νb) and in the exchange rate
(νr); uNBR could be also induced by an exogenous innovation in monetary policy.
The three innovations on the quantitative variables are not independent since
uTR ≡ uFTA + uNBR. Hence, uNBR can be replaced in the last equation by the
difference between the innovation in total reserves and the innovation in the demand
for fixed-term advances. As a result, by substituting equations 2 and 3 in 4, the
latter can be rewritten as follows:34
4’) −(α+ β)uOV = (φd − σd)νd + (φb + σb)νb + φrνr + σsνs
Finally, the equation for the exchange rate35 establishes that its innovation can
be affected by the innovations in all the other variables included in the VAR. We
can thus write
ur + γ
′
TRuTR + γNBRuNBR + γOV uOV = σ
rνr
or equivalently, since uTR ≡ uFTA + uNBR,
5) ur + γTRuTR + γFTAuFTA + γOV uOV = σ
rνr
where obviously γTR = γ
′
TR + γNBR and γFTA = −γNBR.
Equations 2),3),4’) and 5) provide the specified version of 1) for our model. In
extensive form:
6)

1 0 α 0
0 1 −β 0
0 0 −(α+ β) 0
γTR γFTA γOV 1


uTR
uFTA
uOV
ur
 =

σd 0 0 0
0 σb 0 0
(φd − σd) (φb + σb) σs φr
0 0 0 σr


νd
νb
νs
νr

The order condition for the identification of the complete VAR model is violated
since 21 variances and covariances are available from the first stage of the estimation
and these are not sufficient to obtain the 23 parameters included in the structural
34The following is the correct formulation, given that our notation is slightly different from the
one in Bernanke and Mihov (1998). In De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998) the corresponding
equation contained a mistake which however did not affect the results of the estimation.
35In our definition, an increase (decrease) in the exchange rate represents a real depreciation
(appreciation) of the Lira with respect to the DM.
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form, whose lower-right corner is 6). Identification can be achieved by imposing ap-
propriate constraints that reflect different operating procedures of monetary policy.
We describe two possible monetary regimes based on these operating procedures,
one based on the control of the overnight rate and the other on the control of the
nonborrowed reserves aggregate36. Technically, these regimes correspond to two dis-
tinct overidentified structures that can be tested in order to select which one, if
any, is accepted by the data. In our framework, overidentification requires fixing 3
parameters.
(1) OV Regime. In this policy regime the monetary authorities offset all ex-
ogenous shifts in the market for bank reserves (i.e., all the structural innovations
νd and νb) so as to control the overnight rate. In terms of parameter constraints
this means that φd = σdand φb = −σb. Moreover, the authorities are also assumed
not to allow the supply of nonborrowed reserves to respond to innovations in the
exchange rate: i.e., φr = 0. Therefore, eq. 4’) becomes:
−(α+ β)uOV = σsνs
and the relative estimated indicator of monetary policy shocks (i.e., σsνs) is propor-
tional to the estimated innovation in the overnight interest rate.
(2) NBR Regime. In this quantitative regime the monetary authorities are as-
sumed to offset exogenous shifts in the market for bank reserves in order to control
the total amount of nonborrowed reserves. In this case, the central bank’s operating
procedures imply φd = 0, φb = 0 and φr = 0 as the appropriate parameter con-
straints. The estimated indicator of monetary policy shocks then coincides with the
innovation in the nonborrowed components of reserves:
uNBR ≡ uTR − uFTA = σsνs
5.2 Data, Estimation and Results
We estimate the model between June 1989 and May 1998. The sample does not
include the 80s as in this period monetary policy in Italy could not be described
as following a market-based approach. We also excluded the last months of 1998
because the (credible) announcement of the “in-countries” might have affected the
conduct of monetary policy in the second half of 1998.
All data are monthly. The variables included in the VAR are (from top to bot-
tom): the consumer price index and the industrial production index as nonpolicy
variables; total bank reserves, fixed-term advances and the overnight interest rate
as policy variables; finally, the real exchange rate between Italy and Germany as
the last variable. The price index, the industrial production index and the real
36See De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998) for other regimes as well as for an analysis of just-
identified structures.
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exchange rate have been log-transformed. Total reserves and fixed-term advances
have been normalized by dividing them by the 18-month (past) moving average of
total reserves in order to use the level relationship among total reserves, fixed-term
advances and nonborrowed reserves.37 Since the Italian banking system experienced
some relevant changes in the reserve requirement ratios in the sample period, we
used the adjusted series for total bank reserves offered by the Bank of Italy.38 The
overnight rate is in levels. Further details on the data are given in the Appendix.
The number of lags employed is six and the estimation is based on the FIML
method. As shown in Table 1, the results in De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998)
are confirmed. In particular, the regime based on controlling the overnight rate is
accepted, while the overidentifying test rejects the hypothesis that the Bank of Italy
in the 90s was targeting the nonborrowed reserves aggregate.
Table 1: Estimation Results
α β Overid.Test (prob.)
OV -0.149 0.486 0.23
(0.11) (0.11)
NBR 0.824 1.437 2.11e-12
(0.167) (0.165)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis; bold face indicates 95% significance.
This conclusion seems valid not only in the full sample, but also in the 1993–96
subsample characterized by the free floating of the Lira (see De Arcangelis and Di
Giorgio, 1998). Hence, although the role of the exchange rate varied from being an
intermediate target to only working as a transmission channel39, there is no evidence
that this induced a change in the monetary policy operating procedures.
The impulse response functions generated by monetary policy shocks in the two
regimes that we have compared are shown in Figures 9 and 10.40 These pictures
provide further support to the OV regime.
37Bernanke and Mihov (1997a) claim that this kind of strategy is more appropriate than the
short-run normalization proposed by Strongin (1995).
38The only available data on total reserves (adjusted for the numerous changes in the required
reserves ratio) and fixed-term advances refer to the maintenance period of required reserves that
does not coincide with the calendar month (the maintenance period goes from the 15th of one
month to the 14th of the next one). All the other data are instead referred to the common
calendar month. This mismatch may cause some problems in the relationship between the reserve
aggregates and the other data within the month. The problem may appear particularly serious
for the relationship between reserves aggregates and the overnight rate, on which it hinges our
identification procedure. However, when we compared our time series for the interest rate with
another series that matches the reserve aggregate period, we found very high correlation in both
levels and in first differences between the series. Hence, the bias introduced by the mismatch does
not seem to be operatively very relevant, although methodologically important.
39See Arcelli and Di Giorgio (1995).
40All impulse response functions have been constructed by designing a restrictive monetary shock
leading to a 100 basis-point increase in the overnight rate for all the monetary regimes. Responses
in output, prices and the exchange rate are percent deviations from the corresponding variables’
values before the shock. Dashed-line bands refer to the 95% confidence interval and are computed
by the delta method (Hamilton, 1994, and Amisano and Giannini, 1997).
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In Figure 9, after a monetary contraction, output falls at impact. The slowdown
in economic activity lasts for about two years, but it is statistically significant only
in the period between the 8thand the 18th month after the shock. Although we
have not included a commodity price index, we find no evidence of a price puzzle.41
The response in terms of the price level is never significantly different from zero.
Although total reserves slightly increase right after the monetary contraction, this
effect is totally explained by the response in the demand for fixed-term advances
(FTA), that increase considerably at impact and in the first 3 months after the
shock. As a consequence, nonborrowed reserves do indeed fall, exactly as predicted
by the standard liquidity effect, and the model does not exhibit a liquidity puzzle
either. Finally, the response of the exchange rate is never statistically significant at
our confidence level. Overall, these IRFs seem coherent with textbook predictions
of the effects of a monetary policy shock. We interpret them as a signal of correct,
although still parsimonious, specification of the statistical model.
We also computed the Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (FEVD) of both
the price level and output (Figure 11). This exercise provides information about the
quantitative importance of each of the identified structural shocks in explaining the
variability of our nonpolicy variables. Exogenous monetary policy shocks account
(significantly at the 95% level) for about 15 to 20% of the output volatility one year
after the shock, while their contribution to price volatility is almost null. Exactly
the opposite is true for exogenous shocks to the real exchange rate: these have
been particularly effective on price dynamics. Hence, exogenous monetary policy
shocks were important in determining output dynamics, while the sharp reduction
in inflation of the 90s might be explained by either the endogenous component of
monetary policy42 or by the dynamics of the exchange rate (first as an intermediate
target, and then as a transmission channel of monetary impulses).
The IRF shown in Figure 10 are relative to a monetary policy shock in the
NBR regime. They are clearly less appealing, when not intuitively totally wrong.
Following the same monetary contraction, the reduction in output is practically
never statistically significant and prices show a persistent increase. The response of
the exchange rate indicates a real depreciation following (for about one year) the
monetary contraction.
In Figure 12, we plot the estimated monetary policy shocks in the OV model. By
construction, they have a noisy pattern that makes them hard to be interpreted as
a possible source of change in any other relevant macro variable. However, we still
would like to check whether it is possible to link these exogenous monetary policy
shocks to changes in the level of the overnight interest rate, as obviously the latter
is also affected by overall liquidity and demand conditions in the market for bank
reserves.
41In the smaller sample estimated in De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998), the puzzle was still
present, although only temporary (the first 4 periods) and much less intensively than in the previous
VAR analysis.
42In order to check for this, we have estimated a simple forward looking monetary policy rule
a la Clarida, Gal`i and Gertler (1999a,b) for Italy in the 90s and obtained that the coefficient on
deviations of inflation from target was significantly higher than 1 (1.3), while the one on output
stabilization was not statistically different from zero. We interpret this finding as suggesting that
the endogenous component of Italian monetary policy in the 90s, as embedded in such a simple
monetary policy rule, was focusing on inflation and not on output stabilization.
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In other words, it could be interesting to discover whether in some periods inter-
est rates did fall even in presence of an exogenous restrictive component of policy; or
whether they increased but not for the will of the monetary authorities. In order to
achieve this target, we computed the 3-month centered moving average of our policy
shocks and plotted it against the 3-month change in the level of the overnight rate
(Figure 13). The picture can provide some useful information about some episodes
in the sample under consideration. Two episodes seem to be highlighted. The first
is related to the first months of 1993, after the EMS crisis that led Italy to abandon
the exchange rate peg with the D-mark: money market interest rates were consider-
ably falling even in presence of a neutral or slightly restrictive exogenous component
of policy. The second regards the second half of 1997 and the first months of 1998,
when the reduction in the overnight was slow and gradual. The picture indicates
that exogenous restrictive components in the monetary policy stance were actually
countering the interest-rate fall.
5.3 Robustness
A preliminary check of robustness for the model presented above consists in re-
estimating it with quarterly data.43 This is important for two reasons. First, we
want to check whether our identification mechanism based on no contemporaneous
reaction of the nonpolicy variables to monetary policy shocks is still acceptable at
such a lower frequency (it would not be so, for example, with yearly data). Second,
as we are interested in documenting the effects of a monetary policy shock on a set
of real variables whose data are quarterly, the simplest available strategy is to use
the quarterly version of the model to produce the necessary monetary policy shocks.
It turns out that the monetary regime based on the control of the overnight
rate is still accepted when the model is estimated with quarterly data. We plot
the corresponding IRF in Figure 14. It is evident that the qualitative results are
very similar to the ones obtained in the monthly version of the model. The only
exception is the response of the exchange rate, which is now significantly positive
after a monetary contraction.44
Another exercise was performed in De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1999), where
a closed-economy version of the model, including a wider monetary aggregate (M1),
is estimated. The finding that the operating procedures of the central bank were
aiming at controlling the overnight rate is confirmed. Moreover, by adding M1 to the
VAR, the effects of a money demand shock can also be studied. The latter induces
an impact positive response in the overnight rate, indicating that the money demand
shock is only partially accommodated by the central bank.
We now turn to study how monetary policy shocks are transmitted to the econ-
omy.
43We used quarterly GDP at constant 1995 prices as a measure of output, and the GDP deflator.
All the other variables have been obtained as quarterly averages of the original monthly data.
44This “exchange rate puzzle” is due to the simultaneous relation of interest and exchange rate
innovations. This problem obviously becomes more relevant with quarterly data. It is also probably
due to the sample bias in the data originated by the large swings of the Lira in Summer 1992 and
Winter 1995.
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6 Monetary Transmission
We will focus on the effect of a monetary policy shock on real and nominal variables,
and we will try to check whether any conclusion can be drawn from aggregate
data about the monetary transmission channels that are at work in the Italian
economy. In particular, we will try to establish whether any evidence can be obtained
suggesting the effectiveness of a credit channel of monetary transmission45. This
channel would work side by side with the traditional Keynesian mechanism based
on changes in the real interest and exchange rates.
6.1 Real Variables
We start by investigating how a monetary policy shock affects the components of
aggregate demand, in particular consumption and investment, and aggregate em-
ployment. Since national accounting data on these variables are released quarterly,
we used the quarterly version of our OV model to estimate a monetary policy shock
and to analyze its effects on the real economy. There are two possible methodologies
that can be followed, given the limited availability of data.
The first consists in estimating a series of VARs identical to the one described in
section 5, but for the substitution of output with another real variable (consumption,
investment, imports, exports, employment, earnings). In this case, we maintain our
identification hypothesis, with the drawback that we are excluding output from
the reaction function of the central bank and substituting it with another variable.
This could seem quite strong. However, given the major concern about inflation
reduction in the 90s, we are quite convinced that output stabilization was not too
heavily weighted in the reaction function of the Bank of Italy. Our estimates of
a simple monetary rule a la Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1999a,b) support this belief.46
The endogenous component of monetary policy was aiming at reducing inflation.
Our analysis in section 5 shows that exogenous monetary policy shocks did instead
negatively affect output. Overall, these results indicate that although monetary
policy was successful in reducing inflation, it also played a role in the observed slow
dynamics in the real economy.
The alternative methodology is to order the policy block first in the VAR and
assume that prices and output can contemporaneously react to monetary policy
shocks, but that the policy variables are not contemporaneously affected by inno-
vations in the nonpolicy variables. Hence, one can estimate a series of VARs with
different real variables listed last. The two exercises would provide similar results
if the variance-covariance matrix of the innovations were close to block-diagonal.47
In this case, the selected identification strategy would not affect estimation results,
meaning that it would be true that neither policy nor nonpolicy variables react con-
temporaneously to innovations in the other group of variables. Given the previously
expressed caveats about the soundness of our identification strategy in a quarterly
45See Bernanke (1993), Kashyap and Stein (1994) and Hubbard (1995) for a discussion of the
credit channel. Di Giorgio (1995) surveys the first empirical studies focusing on Italy.
46See footnote 42.
47The only value added of this second modeling strategy would be to obtain the response of the
nonpolicy variables within the first quarter.
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model, we have followed both the alternatives, and found that some differences
emerge only with respect to the response of employment (and of real earnings (re-
tribuzioni lorde reali)) to a monetary policy shock. The response of employment
was however limited and mostly concentrated in the industrial sector.
In Figure 15, we plot the (significant) response of GDP, aggregate consumption,
investment, exports and imports to a monetary contraction leading to an increase
of 100 basis points in the overnight rate. As expected, investments show a quick
and pronounced fall with a negative peak at about 6 quarters. Consumption and
output do also fall, but more gradually and less intensively. We also observe a
strong negative reaction of real imports. This is explained by the fall in output
and by the fact that, in the quarterly version of our model, a monetary contraction
has a significant (but puzzling) effect on the real exchange rate, as it induces a real
depreciation. The response of exports is also negative (even though somehow more
difficult to interpret, as this component of aggregate demand is heavily dependent
on foreign variables which are not considered in the VAR, as foreign income and
foreign interest rates).48
Notice that, at first, the responses of consumption and investment seem to be
coherent with the standard money view of the transmission mechanism. The initial
propagation of the monetary shock is attributed to a change in the real interest rate
that affects investment. The fall in investment reduces output and income; it is
then transmitted to consumption and so on, via the standard multiplier analysis.
However, we should notice that the strong impact response of investment may be
somehow puzzling since this component should react to changes in the long-term
real interest rates rather than to changes in nominal short-term ones. Moreover, em-
pirical investigations have usually reported poor performance of the interest rate as
an explanatory variable on aggregate investments (see Hubbard, 1997, for a survey).
As argued by Bernanke and Gertler (1995) in their study on the US economy, this
reasoning could suggest that other transmission mechanisms might be originated by
the monetary policy shock.
In order to further check this possibility, we move to study the response of in-
vestment and consumption components. Although these are statistically significant
only for the first two quarters after the policy shock, Figure 17 shows that the im-
pact response in the consumption sector is much quicker and stronger for durables
with respect to both nondurables and services. In Figure 18, we plot the significant
responses of investment components. After a monetary policy shock, investments in
transportation means decline more rapidly and intensively. Machinery equipment
and housing investments decline more gradually. The less responsive component is
that of gross fixed investment, whose reaction is however also the longer lasting (8
quarters).
This evidence on the composition effects of a policy shock is actually perfectly
consistent with the traditional money view, as the faster reacting investment com-
ponents are those more dependent on a short-term interest rate. Of course, this does
not imply that a credit channel of monetary policy transmission is not at work in
48We also derived the IRF to an exogenous shock to the real exchange rate, in order to check the
response of trade components to a real depreciation, obtaining that real exports do significantly
increase for about one year, and real imports fall (Figure 16).
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the Italian economy, as suggested by some other previous studies.49 It only supports
the view that from aggregate data it is quite difficult to obtain empirical evidence
that can be used to disentangle the different transmission channels. As a matter
of fact, the money channel works through bank liabilities while the credit channel
through bank assets. However, assets and liabilities are linked by accounting identi-
ties, and this originates a difficult identification problem. Some more useful insight
may be provided by empirical studies using disaggregated data on firms and banks.
Although much work remain to be done in this field, the first papers that have
examined whether heterogenous banks and firms respond differently to the same
monetary policy shock seem to support the view that a broadly defined credit chan-
nel of monetary policy transmission, including a financial balance-sheet channel, is
at work in the Italian economy.50
We also studied the response of employment and real earnings to a monetary
policy shock, obtaining a small (and not very long lasting) fall in both variables
(Figure 19).
In summary, after a monetary policy shock, output falls as the result of a reduc-
tion in both real investments and (by a smaller amount) consumption. The demand
components which respond faster and more intensively to the shock are those of
consumption durables and investment in transportation means. Real imports fall.
Employment is only slightly affected, as well as real earnings. Finally, prices are
maintained mostly constant, so that inflation is also reduced.51
6.2 Nominal Variables
We now move to investigate the impact of a monetary policy shock on the whole
interest rate structure, and on variables in the banking sector. We apply the same
methodology used to study the response of real variables, but we use the monthly
version of our model. As we cannot exclude the contemporaneous reaction of interest
rates to a monetary policy shock, we have ordered last in the VAR the variables we
investigate (one at a time, due to limited availability of the data).52 First, we
have estimated the dynamic response of four different returns on Government Debt
(Figure 20). After a 1% increase in the overnight rate on interbank loans, we would
normally observe a flatter yield-curve, as the response of the rate on shorter term
debt (like 3-month and 6-month BOTs) is considerably higher (and longer lasting)
than that on either 12-month BOT or 5 years BTP. This is probably due to the so
called expected inflation effect induced by a monetary contraction. As the agents
49See Buttiglione and Ferri (1994) and Bagliano and Favero (1995).
50See Angeloni et al. (1995) for a study based on the balance sheets of Italian banks, and Rondi
et al. (1993) for a study on a panel of Italian firms. The same conclusion is also suggested by some
descriptive figures on the financial and industrial structure of the country. See Di Giorgio (1995).
51Overall, one could be quite skeptical about the seemingly absence of any transmission lag from
the monetary policy shock to the real economy. However, previous evidence on monetary policy
transmission lags was mostly related to monetary policy interventions, including the endogenous
component of policy, rather than to monetary policy shocks. For a cross-country comparison of
output and inflation responses to an interest rate shock in a simple 4 variable VAR model, see
Cecchetti (1999).
52Given the limited number of observations, we substituted the real exchange rate for all the
interest rates and the quantity of loans. An attempted FIML estimation of a 7-variables VAR
(including the exchange rate) showed serious problems of convergence.
19
perceive this policy to be effective on prices, inflation expectations are reduced.
This pushes long-term interest rates down. However, our simulations suggest that
this effect on the return on higher-maturity debt is not strong enough to offset the
standard liquidity effect induced by the monetary contraction. As a result, long-
term interest rates do still increase, even though considerably less with respect to
short term-ones.53
Then, we focused on banking sector variables and studied how the lending-
borrowing spread and the quantity of loans to residents are affected by an exogenous
monetary policy shock. In Figure 21 we observe that lending rates react quicker and
more intensively with respect to deposit rates. Hence, a contractionary monetary
policy shock seems to widen the lending-borrowing spread: the effect is significant
for about one year and is particularly relevant between the second and the sixth
month. The average interest rate on loans does also increase more than the risk-free
returns on long-term debt. A similar finding had already been obtained by Bagliano
and Favero (1995) and Buttiglione and Ferri (1994) in previous VAR studies on
Italy54. They interpreted it as possible evidence for a credit channel in monetary
policy transmission, in analogy to the widening of the spread between the rate on
commercial paper and the T-Bill rate observed in the US economy (see Kashyap,
Stein and Wilcox, 1993, and Kashyap and Stein, 1994). Or at least for the existence
of one of the prerequisites for this channel to work (the imperfect substitutability
between different financial assets and heterogeneity in the cost of business funding).
In addition, Buttiglione and Ferri (1994) used data on credit lines granted by banks
and credit effectively used by firms in a smaller sample (1988-may 1993) to obtain
evidence of a credit supply contraction following a monetary policy shock. This
evidence would also suggest a plausible active bank credit channel of policy trans-
mission. We could not check whether their finding is confirmed in our model because
of a data break in the time series “credit granted” after 1995. We just studied the
response of the quantity of bank loans in lire used by residents and obtained no
economically significant reaction of this variable to the policy shock.55
53This could as well be due to the fact that in the sample we studied the Bank of Italy was still
working on building its anti-inflation reputation. Buttiglione, Del Giovane and Gaiotti (1997) have
conducted a similar exercise using a single equation approach in the 1990-95 period. They studied
the effects of changes in two distinct policy rates (the discount rate and the rate on repos), trying
to disentangle the liquidity from the expected inflation effect of a monetary policy intervention.
They find that the repo rate does mainly affect the shorter term segment of the yield curve, while
the effect of a change in the discount rate was more effective on inflation expectations.
54See Nistico` (1999) for a preliminary study of different regional responses of banking sector
variables to a monetary policy shock.
55In a recent study, Favero et al. (1999) analyzed the response of loans to a contractionary mon-
etary policy reducing bank reserves using balance-sheet data from banks in Italy, France, Germany
and Spain. They find no evidence of a bank lending channel in monetary policy transmission in
these countries. As in our study loans are generally not affected by a monetary contraction. In
Germany, Italy and Spain, they also observe that smaller banks do actually expand loans after a
contractionary monetary policy. This finding could be rationalized as the attempt to benefit from
the higher intermediation margin that is available after the interest rate policy shock.
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7 Conclusions
This paper deals with the identification and transmission of monetary policy shocks
to the Italian economy. It shows that correct identification can be obtained by
linking econometric analysis with a detailed description of the institutional and
operative procedures used by the central bank to intervene in the money market. In
particular this analysis allows the researcher to avoid the need of arbitrarily choosing
a measure of monetary policy shocks. Different monetary policy regimes can be
nested in the same model and directly tested, so that the correct representation of
the exogenous monetary policy shocks is selected by the data itself. Our results can
be summarized as follows.
In the 90s, monetary policy in Italy has been based on an interest rate targeting
regime, with the central bank controlling the rate on overnight loans. We find no
evidence that the monetary policy regime has been affected by the different roles
performed by the exchange rate in the sample, although this conclusion needs to
be further checked. Shocks to the overnight rate, or the residual of a regression
of this rate on a set of variables in the information set of the central bank, can
then be interpreted as purely exogenous monetary policy shocks, as opposed to the
endogenous component of policy which might result from a feedback rule linking the
monetary policy instrument to different state variables.
Our impulse response analysis is fully coherent with the expected effect of a
monetary policy shock on output and inflation. In particular output declines after a
contractionary shock, while the price level is kept mainly constant. Our estimated
monetary policy shocks explain about 20% of output volatility but very little of
price variability. This finding does not suggest however that monetary policy was
not effective on inflation in the period we study. On the contrary, it might well
be that the “endogenous” component of policy was very successful in achieving the
primary target of monetary policy. In this direction, our estimates of a monetary
policy forward looking rule a la Clarida, Gal`i and Gertler (1999a,b) suggest that in
the recent past, in Italy, monetary policy was mainly directed to counteract inflation.
Output stabilization was not explicitly given a particular weight. These two pieces of
evidence lead us to conclude that monetary policy “actions” (including endogenous
and exogenous components of monetary policy) were indeed effective in reducing
inflation in the 90s. Exogenous monetary policy shocks must also be considered
partially responsible for the low output growth observed.
We also show how it is possible to use the model to simulate the response of
different nominal and real variables to a monetary policy shock, thereby collecting
some aggregate evidence on monetary policy transmission. Although our findings
are generally consistent with predictions of both the money and the credit view
of monetary policy, we were not able to distinctly identify the different channels
of transmission of monetary policy. It has already been stressed that aggregate
macroeconometric analysis performs poorly in this job (Hubbard, 1995). Identifying
whether bank credit falls after a monetary contraction because of a shrink in the
supply of loans (as suggested by the credit view) or because of a reduction in the
demand for credit induced by the increase in the interest rate (as underlined in the
money view) is not an easy task. And similar difficulties arise when concentrating on
price (interest rates) behavior rather than on credit quantities. When disaggregated
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data on banks and firms are used, conclusions are less disputable. Asymmetric and
distributive effects of monetary policy could not only be reflecting the higher cost
of funds, as stressed in the money view. The weight of monetary restrictions falls
disproportionally on the shoulders of small firms, whose borrower’s ability declines,
and of small banks, whose liability management is harder. This seems particularly
relevant in Italy: the high percentage of small firms compared to big corporations in
this country suggests that the role of a “broad” lending channel is relevant. Up to
now, no success has however been obtained in measuring which part of the output
effect of an exogenous monetary policy shock is due to the credit rather than to the
interest rate (or the exchange rate) channel.
Further empirical studies on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
would necessarily rely on disaggregated and sectoral data. However, they will have to
explicitly tackle the problem of correctly identifying truly exogenous policy shocks.
We hope this paper will be useful in this direction.
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Figure 6: Impulse Response Functions in the 3-variable VAR
(a) M2 as policy variable
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Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions in the 4-variable VAR (1982:1-1998:5)
(a) M2 as policy variable
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Figure 8: Impulse Response Functions in the 4-variable VAR (1990:1-1998:5)
(a) M2 as policy variable
Response of  the Price Level  to  e_m
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